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quotation. The third marga scheme outlined in “Appendix 1** (there is only 
one appendix) could certainly have been made more specific and its origins 
identified (Hui-yiian?).
But despite these minor shortcomings Tanaka’s study of what Hui-yiian 
had to say concerning the Kuan ching is a welcome breath of non-sectarian 
fresh air trailing through the stale confines of the inevitably pejorative inter­
pretation of this great scholar at the hands of modern shQgaku scholars. And 
it is unlikely that another translation of this commentary will appear for a 
long, long time. Although one would have appreciated a more extensive 
bibliography, this work should be required reading for any student of Pure 
Land Buddhist thought. One only hopes that Tanaka’s next project will be 
Hui-yiian’s Ta-ch‘eng ta-i-chang.
Mark L. Blum
BUDDHA NATURE. By Sallie B. King. State University of New York 
Press, /Albany, New York, 1991. xi + 205 pp. with notes, glossary, and 
index. ISBN 0-7914-0427-7 (hardback), 0-7914-0428-5 (paperback).
Given the prominence of the concept of Buddha nature in East Asian Bud­
dhism, it is perhaps surprising that there have not been more studies in 
Western languages dealing directly with this subject. The book under review is 
a philosophical/textual study of the Buddha Nature Treatise (BNT), an early 
and important work on the subject attributed to Vasubandhu and extant only 
in the Chinese translation (Fo xing tun) of Paramfirtha.1
Rather than the general pattern of academic works in Buddhology, which 
would involve heavy textual and conceptual discussions followed by a com­
plete annotated translation, this book is instead a series of essays focussing on 
the Buddha Nature Treatise and the meaning and implications of the Buddha 
nature concept. Although a full translation of the text is not provided, 
references to the text are clearly identified with the Taishd page number, mak­
ing it easy for those who wish (like the reviewer) to refer to the original 
Chinese. The book provides a solid introduction to the basic ideas involved in 
the Buddha nature concept, and good discussions of the philosophical prob-
Sallie King also contributed an article on “Buddha Nature, Thought and 
Mysticism” to a recent collection of essays on the same subject, Buddha Nature: A 
Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota, Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan, eds. 
Reno, Nevada: Buddhist Books International, 1991.
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lems and implications that such a concept entails.
Chapter One provides introductory material on the role of the Buddha 
nature concept, its relationship (at least in the BNT) to Yogacftra, basic 
background on the BNT text itself (especially the crucial role of Paramartha), 
the importance of Buddha nature in Chinese Buddhist thought, and a list of 
basic themes the author intends to pursue.
Chapter Two begins with the opening question of the BNT: “Why did the 
Buddha speak of Buddha nature?*' and proceeds to outline the interpretation 
of Buddha nature presented in this text. King is (rightly) concerned to show 
that the BNT takes pains to argue that Buddha nature should not be taken to 
mean a substantial self. In fact one of King's purposes in the book as a whole 
(as it must be in any work dealing with Buddha nature) is “to grapple with the 
common charge that the notion of Buddha nature (or tathOgatagarbha) 
introduces into Buddhism the non-Buddhist, crypto-Hindu element of 
OtmavQda (a view of an entitative, metaphysical self or soul) or idealistic 
monism” (p. 28). King concludes that the essence of Buddha nature is its 
“functions'* or “actions”: Buddha nature is not an “entity” but a promise to 
be realized through practice.
Chapters Three and Four build on the arguments of the previous chapter by 
discussing Buddha nature as the “practice” of Buddhism. The technical 
nature of the discussion, with its focus on trikaya, the “dereification of self 
and mind,” dharmakOya and the Self, Pure Mind, and so forth, will strike the 
reader as being in stark contrast to the straightforward and easily understood 
similes, for example, of the TathOgatagarbha stltra, such as “the pure gold in 
the mud,” or “the prince in the poor woman's womb.” In fact this well il­
lustrates the philosophical dilemma of Buddha nature concepts—on the one 
hand its updyic simplicity that implies the existence of an “entity,” and, on 
the other hand, the tortured explanations that seek to incorporate Buddha 
nature concepts in a §Onyatic orthodoxy. King succeeds in showing that the 
author of the BNT, at least, intends to show that Buddha nature is not an enti­
ty and can be described in terms not antithetical to basic Mahayana concepts 
such as filnyata. A further problem, however, is whether this understanding 
carried over into the wider discourse and understanding of Buddha nature 
by the broad majority of Buddhists in East Asia. Many have argued that 
such was not the case, and that in fact the Buddha nature concept opened the 
door for ideas antithetical to sQnyata and pratTtya-samutpOda to enter and 
dominate East Asian Buddhism.2
In the remaining chapters King takes up further themes associated with Bud­
dha nature. In Chapter Five she discusses a common theme in Western 
literature on the subject: whether or not the “ontology” of Buddha nature 
can be categorized as “monism.” The pioneering work of Obermiller, Taka-
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saki, Nagao, Ruegg, and others are succinctly presented with the conclusion 
that “the Buddha nature thought of the BNT should not be understood as 
monistic” (p. 115) but should be described as “non-dualism.”
Chapter Six returns to the theme of Buddhist practice and “engaging in 
spiritual cultivation,” and presents “faithful joy, prq/nd, meditative concen­
tration, and mahakaruna" as characteristic of the BNT’s instructions on prac­
tice. Chapter Seven returns to the theme of the concept of person, and ex­
amines the meaning of individual personhood in terms of Buddha nature in 
the BNT.
The final Chapter Eight, “Retrospective and Prospective,” summarizes 
King’s conclusions concerning the BNT and Chinese Buddhist thought in 
terms of 1. the positive nature of realization, 2. the optimistic conception of 
human nature, 3. nondualism and thusness, 4. subject-object dualism, 5. a 
positive view of phenomenal reality, 6. enlightenment as a pivotal conversion, 
and 7. Buddha nature is Buddhist practice.
Some final comments on Buddha nature thought and Western Buddhism in 
this chapter point to themes and problems not adequately addressed in this 
book. Indeed it is ironic that the book has appeared just as the Buddha nature 
ethos is being radically questioned and accused of being at the root of many 
social problems by some major Japanese Buddhist scholars (see note 2 above). 
To her credit, King does raise the question by pointing out, “Why East Asian 
Buddhists have been moved to act as little as they have in the social arena is a 
vast and complex issue that cannot be treated here” (p. 170). Yet it seems that 
she perceives potential for good consequences in the Buddha nature idea for 
the modern (Western?) world and those involved in the movement of “Engag­
ed Buddhism.” Those familiar with the consequences of a naive acceptance of 
the Buddha nature ethos may be more inclined to warn of its dangers. Indeed, 
the investigation of the potential promise and implications of Buddha nature 
concepts for Western Buddhism, as well as critical and honest studies of the 
failure (or success) of this ethos in Asian Buddhist countries, are important 
areas for future research. King’s book offers a good theoretical introduction 
to Buddha nature and an indispensable guide to the BNT that all Buddhist 
scholars should have on their shelves, but we shall have to turn elsewhere to in-
2 See recent work by Hakamaya Noriaki (Hongaku shisO hihan [Critique of the 
thought of inherent enlightenment] and Hihan bukkyO [Critical Buddhism], both from 
DaizO Shuppan, 1989 and 1990) and Matsumoto ShirO (Engi to kQ [PratTtya- 
samutpada and fQnyata], Tokyo: DaizO Shuppan, 1989), reviewed in the Japanese 
Journal of Religious Studies 17/1 (1990), 89-91. See also the essays in the Kiyota 
Festschrift mentioned above, and my “ ‘Zen is not Buddhism’: Recent Japanese Criti­
ques of Buddha-nature” (forthcoming).
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vestigate the concrete social and cultural implications of Buddha nature. 
Paul L. Swanson
THE ORIGINS OF INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY. By N. Ross Reat. 
Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, 1990. 356 pp. with bibliographical 
references, index. ISBN 0-89581-923-6 (cloth), 0-89581-924-4 (pbk).
Having met and become friends with the author several years ago on the old 
precincts of the Eastern Buddhist, I confess to being favorably disposed 
towards this book from the start. (Reat may be better known to others as the 
author of a semi-infamous article on “Insiders and Outsiders in the Study of 
Religious Traditions.’*) As it turns out, that predisposition was one of the few 
things that enabled me to make it through some of the less enthralling por­
tions of this work.
Reat’s approach is historical, which is as unremarkable to a Western au­
dience as it is unexamined as a methodology. Still the continuity that he is able 
to discern beginning with Vedic materials and extending through the early Bud­
dhist suttas gives him a coherent theme, and his analysis of the material is com­
prehensive and deeply rewarding. He spends almost the first half of the book 
on Vedic material exclusively, which to judge from the relative scarcity of rele­
vant citations, indicates the thoroughness of his treatment. The next two sec­
tions examine the Upan is ads, and the precise extent and manner in which they 
differ from their Vedic roots. The final section, entitled “The Fundamentals 
of Buddhist Psychology,’* is the most interesting, and could most likely stand 
on its own, though certain lines of the argument would be truncated. To give 
only one example, his discussion of the evolution and significance of the term 
nama-rttpa is a wonderfully clear illustration of how de-contextualization 
leads to interpretive distortion. The topic I found most intriguing was the simi­
larity between early Buddhist ideas and what later developed as the Yogacara 
school of Mahayana philosophy. The evidence is strong, though one some­
times feels that Reat is constructing his argument on foundations that are not 
as solid as he takes them to be. The striking parallelism he uncovers suggests 
a re-evaluation of the development of Buddhist philosophy, and Indian 
philosophy in general, relegating both Abhidharma scholasticism and its 
countervailing Madhyamaka dialectic to the fringes, as aberrations in the 
great mainstream of Buddhist philosophy culminating in Yogacara, arguably 
the most successful form of Buddhist philosophy ever to emerge from India. 
His elucidation of similarities between Upanisadic teachings and the early
147
